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Causal Processes and Interactions: What
Are They and What Are They Good
For?
Christopher Hitchcock†‡
Concerning any object of philosophical analysis, we can ask several questions, including
the two posed in the title of this paper. Despite difficulties in formulating a precise
criterion to distinguish causal processes from pseudoprocesses, and causal interactions
from mere spatiotemporal intersections, I argue that Salmon answered the first of these
questions with extraordinary clarity. The second question, by contrast, has received
very little attention. I will present two problems: in the first, it seems that Salmon has
provided exactly the conceptual resources needed to solve the problem; in the second,
it is difficult to see how causal processes and interactions may be used to shed any
light. In general, the way to carry Salmon’s program forward will be to demonstrate
that these resources can be made to do real philosophical work.
For the last quarter century of his life, Wesley Salmon strove to develop
an adequate theory of causal processes and interactions. He was partic-
ularly concerned to distinguish these from certain impostors: pseudopro-
cesses and ‘mere intersections’, respectively. For brevity, I will often speak
only of the distinction between causal and pseudoprocesses, even when
my comments pertain to both distinctions. In fact, I will do so now. We
may ask the following four questions about the former distinction:
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1. Is there a genuine distinction between causal and pseudoprocesses?
2. Are we able to judge when a process is causal, and when it is pseudo?
3. How, exactly, is this distinction to be characterized?
4. To what philosophical use can this distinction be put? Or, to borrow
the colorful terminology of Putnam (1962): Does it cut any philo-
sophic ice, bake any philosophic bread, or wash any philosophic
windows?
The literature—works by Salmon as well as his critics—has focused
almost exclusively on question 3. In fact, Salmon offered a number of
different answers to question 3, with several revisions motivated by crit-
icisms. Early versions of his mark-transmission theory appear in several
articles published in the late ’70s and early ’80s (Salmon 1977, 1978, 1982).
In response to criticisms from Bas van Fraassen (1980, 123), Salmon
clarified the notion of a causal interaction by drawing a distinction be-
tween conjunctive and interactive forks. In response to a counterexample
from Nancy Cartwright (described in Salmon 1984, 148), Salmon incor-
porated certain counterfactuals into his characterization of causal pro-
cesses and interactions. Further criticisms, especially by Philip Kitcher
(1989) and Phil Dowe (1992), led him to believe that this involvement
with counterfactuals was a serious drawback for his mark-transmission
theory. Inspired by Dowe (1992), he reformulated his distinctions in terms
of conserved quantities instead.
I do not wish to deny that question 3 is important and interesting. It
is certainly the business of the philosopher to provide precise character-
izations of rough and ready concepts that others simply take for granted.
But there is an opportunity cost to expending one’s energy on the for-
mulation and criticism of conceptual analyses, and in this instance, the
focus on question 3 has drawn intellectual resources away from the far
more important question 4. Philosophers sometimes adopt the conceit
that a concept should not be employed in philosophical projects until it
has been given a clear and precise definition. I would maintain, by con-
trast, that an affirmative answer to questions 1 and 2 would suffice for
skipping question 3 and proceeding directly to question 4.
Salmon has persuaded me—and he ought to have persuaded you, dear
reader—that the answer to our first two questions is a resounding ‘yes’.
In his many writings on the topic, particularly Scientific Explanation and
the Causal Structure of the World (Salmon 1984), Salmon offered not only
his attempts to explicitly characterize the distinction between causal and
pseudoprocesses, he also offered a great deal of extraordinarily clear yet
informal discussion. For example, he offered a great many illustrations—
he taught us that baseballs, cars, arrows, photons, sound waves, and radio
signals are all causal processes, while shadows and spots of light on walls
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are pseudoprocesses. He taught us that collisions between baseballs or
cars are causal interactions, while the crossings of shadows or light beams
are mere intersections. Moreover, Salmon showed us how the Special
Theory of Relativity presupposes the distinction between causal and pseu-
doprocesses. The first signal principle tells us that ‘nothing’ can travel
faster than the speed of light, or more cautiously, that ‘nothing’ can
accelerate or decelerate across that velocity barrier. Strictly speaking, this
principle is false; many things can accelerate across the velocity of light.
Suppose that a small but powerful laser located at the center of an enor-
mous ‘super-Astrodome’ casts a spot of light on the wall of the stadium.
Then by rotating the laser with sufficient (but subluminal) velocity we
can make the spot on the wall travel faster than light. (Salmon 1984, 141–
142) The moral is that we must restrict the scope of the universal quantifier
in the first signal principle: it applies only to causal processes, and not to
pseudoprocesses. This suggests that the distinction between the two has
an objective basis in the physical word.
If one is offering a stipulative definition of some concept, then the
definition must be crystal clear. It must be possible to determine which
items fall under the concept through the mechanical application of the
definition. By contrast, if one wishes to point to a distinction that has an
objective basis in the world, it suffices to convey enough information
through examples and informal discussion to allow competent speakers
to classify entities under the appropriate categories, even if that classifi-
cation relies explicitly or implicitly on background knowledge and not
merely on the mechanical application of some definition. Salmon has
succeeded admirably in directing our attention to some important physical
distinctions.
If I were to present a number of processes, there would be near unan-
imous agreement among readers of this article about which were causal
and which were pseudo. Moreover, where there was disagreement, it would
result from ignorance of the underlying physics, not from any conceptual
unclarity. (For example, I am ashamed to admit that I still get confused
over phase velocities and group velocities—I would have a fifty-fifty
chance of getting that one wrong.) Our judgment about the status of a
particular process is defeasible, of course, but no more so than our judg-
ment about whether, e.g., a given particle is positively or negatively
charged.
The question that we really need to be asking is this one: Given that
there is a genuine distinction between causal processes and pseudopro-
cesses, what can we do with it? In particular, what sorts of philosophical
problems does it help us to solve?
Here is one type of problem where I think that the concept of a causal
process helps us enormously. In his paper “On the Notion of Cause”
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(1913), Bertrand Russell argued that there is no such thing as causality.
While this paper is no doubt best known for Russell’s irreverent poke at
the British monarchy, it also posed some interesting Zenoesque paradoxes
concerning causation. These paradoxes are addressed to the following
definition, taken from Baldwin’s Dictionary:
Cause and effect . . . are correlative terms denoting any two distin-
guishable things, phases, or aspects of reality, which are so related
that whenever the first ceases to exist the second comes into existence
immediately after. . . .
This definition involves two different components: temporal contiguity
and invariable succession. Russell’s critique of this definition runs along
the following lines: If the cause and effect—call them C and E—are tem-
porally contiguous and distinct, then at least one of them must be tem-
porally extended. For if they are both instantaneous, point-like in time,
then they cannot be contiguous. (Just as two numbers on the real number
line must be separated by some finite distance.) Assume, for the sake of
argument, that C is extended. (Imagine, if you like, that C corresponds
to the half-closed set (0, 1], while E is at least partially open, with 1 as
its greatest lower bound.) But now, by contiguity, only the second half
of C is really efficacious—for the first half of C is at a temporal remove
from E. Repeat this argument for the final three-quarters, seven-eighths,
and so on, and we have an obvious regress. The upshot is that at most
one instantaneous temporal slice of C can be efficacious, contradicting
our assumption that the cause is temporally extended. (An analogous
reductio can be constructed if we assume instead that E is temporally
extended.)
Russell’s puzzle arises because the cause and effect are assumed to be
discrete entities. Within this framework, the only way to capture the idea
that causation is local (there is no causation at a spatiotemporal distance)
is to require that causes and effects be contiguous with one another. One
could have a series of events—a causal chain—linking C and E. But then
the same problem will arise in connection with successive links in the
chain. The notion of a causal process seems to be tailor-made to capture
the spatiotemporal locality of causal influence while avoiding the paradox
that results from assuming discrete events to be contiguous.
Salmon was certainly interested in Zeno’s paradoxes; he did, after all,
edit a book on the topic (Salmon 1970). His mark-transmission theory
of causal processes was heavily influenced by Russell’s ‘At-At’ solution
to Zeno’s paradox of the arrow (see Salmon 1977; 1984, 147–157). There
are even a number of places where Salmon hints that the notion of a
causal process can be used to avoid problems that arise from the as-
sumption that causes and effects are discrete entities (e.g., 1984, 156–157,
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182–183). So far as I am aware, however, Salmon never explicitly ad-
dressed Russell’s Zenoesque puzzle. I harbor little doubt, however, that
Salmon has provided exactly the conceptual resources needed to solve
this puzzle. The exact formulation might take some care: perhaps some
clever graduate student could take up the project and get a nice little
publication to help her on the job market.
In contrast to this puzzle, let us consider the problem of explanatory
irrelevance, as illustrated in Salmon’s famous example:
John Jones avoided becoming pregnant during the past year, for he
has taken his wife’s birth control pills regularly, and every man who
regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy. (Salmon 1971,
34.)
Salmon presents this as a counterexample to Hempel’s Deductive-Nomo-
logical model of scientific explanation (Hempel 1965). John Jones did
indeed consume birth control pills (or so we may suppose), it is indeed
a law that no man who consumes birth control pills will become pregnant,
and Jones’s avoidance of pregnancy does follow deductively from the
preceding premises. Despite all of this, we do not have a successful ex-
planation of Jones’s barrenness. The problem is that the putative expla-
nation provides information that is irrelevant: Jones’s consumption of
birth control pills has nothing to do with his failure to conceive.
Salmon’s example wants for nothing by way of memorability. It does,
however, contain one small red herring. Birth control pills do often prevent
pregnancy in women, but this is in no way a crucial feature of the example.
We would have an equally persuasive counterexample if John Jones had
consumed aspirin or broccoli instead of birth control pills. For the sake
of tradition, I will continue to use Salmon’s original example, but it is
important to keep this point in the back of our minds.
This famous example first appeared in Salmon’s paper “Statistical Ex-
planation” (1971), which introduced his statistical-relevance model of ex-
planation. That theory did indeed offer an effective resolution of this
example: the class of human men is objectively homogeneous with respect
to pregnancy; subdividing the class of men into those that consume birth
control pills and those that do not will not effect a statistically relevant
partition. It is clear that, in this paper, Salmon took statistical relevance
relations—at least statistical relevance relations within otherwise homo-
geneous reference classes—to be intrinsically explanatory. They were ex-
planatory, Salmon believed, because they were closely connected with
causal relevance relations. In fact, he explicitly expressed the hope that
it would eventually be possible to analyze causation in terms of proba-
bility. Throughout the 1970s, however, Salmon became more pessimistic
about the prospects for developing an adequate probabilistic theory of
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causation. This process culminated in 1980 with the publication of an
influential critique of probabilistic theories of causation (Salmon 1980).
Statistical relevance relations, he concluded, could provide evidence for
the existence of causal relations, but they were not constitutive of causal
relations. From the earlier statistical-relevance theory, Salmon maintained
the idea that explanatory relevance is causal relevance, while dropping
the idea that this latter notion could be articulated in terms of probabil-
ities. It was during this same period of time that Salmon began working
on his theory of causal processes and interactions, in the hopes that it
would succeed where probabilistic theories had failed. The problem of
explanatory irrelevance thus played an important, albeit indirect, role in
leading Salmon to his mature theory of causation.
A natural question, then, is how the conceptual resources of Salmon’s
new theory of causation can help us to solve the problem of explanatory
relevance. The answer to this question is not at all obvious. Birth control
pills are causal processes, after all: they are capable of transmitting marks
and conserved quantities. When John Jones swallows a birth control pill,
that is a genuine causal interaction. (More precisely, it is what Salmon
calls a l-type interaction, where two incoming processes merge into a
single outgoing process.) So the problem with the putative explanation is
not that it mistakes a pseudoprocess for a causal process, or a mere in-
tersection for a causal interaction. So just how are the concepts of causal
process and interaction to be of help in explicating what is wrong with
this explanation?
In response to this challenge, defenders of process theories of causation
(and even some of their critics) have offered a number of replies (either
singly or jointly), which I will consider.
Reply 1. We know what processes take place in female bodies when
birth control pills do prevent pregnancy, and we know that these
processes can not take place in a male’s body.
This response results from following the scent of the red herring described
earlier. This response cannot be correct: if we replace Salmon’s example
by one in which John Jones takes aspirin or eats broccoli, the first reply
is simply unavailable. But surely the basic reason for explanatory irrel-
evance is the same in each of these cases.
A second, related, reply avoids this problem:
Reply 2. We know what processes and interactions take place within
male bodies, and we know that those processes are incompatible with
pregnancy, so we know that the addition of birth control pills must
be irrelevant.
There are at least two problems with this reply. The first is that it is not
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at all clear what the appeal to processes and interactions adds that is not
already present in the response provided within the framework of Salmon’s
statistical-relevance model. Men cannot get pregnant, period; therefore,
the consumption of birth control pills cannot make a difference to whether
or not a man becomes pregnant; therefore, the consumption of birth
control pills is not explanatorily relevant to John Jones’s pregnancy. This
line of response is not only available within Salmon’s statistical-relevance
theory, but also within a counterfactual theory of explanation (Lewis 1986,
Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, Woodward 2003), as well as any account
that defines explanatory relevance in terms of necessary or even proba-
bilistically relevant conditions. Is anything really clarified by adding that
a man’s inability to become pregnant is due to various internal processes?
The second problem is more subtle and yet more profound. In sum-
marizing his famous covering-law model of explanation, Carl Hempel
wrote:
scientific explanation . . . seeks to provide a systematic understand-
ing of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic
nexus. (Hempel 1965, 488)
Salmon summarized his own view by modifying this passage:
my suggestion for modification would be to substitute the words ‘how
they fit into a causal nexus’ for ‘that they fit into a nomic nexus’.
(Salmon 1984, 19)
A causal nexus, for Salmon, is a network of causal processes and inter-
actions. More specifically:
If we want to show why E occurred, we fill in the causally relevant
processes and interactions that occupy the past light cone of E. (Sal-
mon 1984, 19)
Of course, what’s at issue here is how to determine which processes and
interactions are causally relevant, but let us bracket this for just a moment.
The point I wish to stress is that explanation, for Salmon, involves the
exhibition of actual causal processes and interactions in the causal history
of the event or phenomenon to be explained. In our example, the event
to be explained is John Jones’s failure to become pregnant during a specific
one-year period. Now how on earth can the causal processes and inter-
sections that take place within other men have any bearing on this? For
one thing it does not seem to be crucial to the example that such processes
and interactions have even occurred in Jones’s past light cone: would the
counterexample not have worked equally well if John Jones had been
replaced by Adam? But even if such processes and interactions had taken
place, these seem to be exactly the sorts of processes and interactions that
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should be deemed irrelevant to Jones’s present state. The goings-on be-
neath the skin of other males surely did not interfere with conception in
Jones’s body!
If the causal processes and interactions that take place within the bodies
of other men have any bearing, it is at best indirect. For example, they
may provide us with information about the statistical relevance of birth
control pill consumption for pregnancy in men. Salmon makes it very
clear in his later work that statistical-relevance relations are not consti-
tutive of causal (and hence explanatory) relations, but can only provide
evidence for the genuinely causal relations consisting of processes and
interactions (see e.g. Salmon 1984, 34n10, 192, 265.) Alternatively, we
may take the processes that occur within other males to provide evidence
about what would have happened in Jones’s body had he not consumed
his wife’s pills. In Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the
World, Salmon grudgingly allowed that counterfactuals play a role in
determining whether a process is causal or not (1984, 148–150); but even
so, it is the processes themselves that figure in genuine explanations, and
not the attendant counterfactuals (see Hitchock 1995, sect. 4, for more
discussion). In the conserved quantity theory proposed by Salmon (1994),
counterfactuals are quite deliberately expunged from the account
altogether.
The upshot, I think, is that the processes and interactions that take
place within the bodies of other males can only have a bearing on the
example insofar as they provide evidence about the processes and inter-
actions that actually occur in Jones’s case.
Have we not just suggested another reply to our challenge? Here it is:
Reply 3. The irrelevance of the birth control pills for John Jones’s
failure to conceive is manifest in the network of microscopic processes
and interactions that take place within Jones’s body.
This reply is unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, we are able
to recognize the irrelevance of pill consumption without any detailed
knowledge of the processes that take place when a male consumes birth
control pills. (At least I lack such detailed knowledge; but I suspect that
you do too, dear reader.)
Second, it seems to me that the original problem is likely to reappear
at the microlevel. When we consider the explanandum, Jones’s failure to
become pregnant during the past year, it is a little difficult to locate this
failure in space and time. If it cannot be assigned a spatiotemporal lo-
cation, then it will not be possible to find any Salmon-style explanation
of it, for it will have no past light cone in which to search for relevant
processes and interactions. So let us say that Jones’s nonpregnant state
does have a location: it occurs within some region of Jones’s body (or
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perhaps his entire body) during the particular span of time in question.
Now, when Jones consumes birth control pills, those pills enter his stom-
ach and are dissolved by hydrochloric acid. The chemical contents of the
pills will be transported throughout his body in his bloodstream, and
hence into the region where his nonpregnancy is supposed to occur. These
are genuinely causal processes and interactions, and they connect his orig-
inal interaction with the pills (his swallowing them) with (various later
parts of) his nonpregnant state. So why do these processes and interactions
not count as ’relevant’ to Jones’s failure to become pregnant? Our original
problem has simply been hidden under Jones’s skin. (See also Hitchcock
1996, sect. 4, for related discussion.)
Finally, there is a more general problem. That Jones’s consumption of
birth control pills is irrelevant to his failure to become pregnant surely
has something to do with the fact that he would have avoided pregnancy
even if he had not taken the pills. We may hope to eliminate the modality
by analyzing it in terms of regularities, correlations, or what have you;
but the surface modality clearly seems to be central. This idea is captured
neatly in Salmon’s statistical-relevance model of explanation. Yet a spec-
ification of the actual processes and interactions that took place tells us
nothing about what would have happened if those processes had not oc-
curred. At best it can give us counterfactual information of the following
sort: There is some conserved quantity Q, such that if the amount of Q
within a certain spatiotemporal region had been q, then it would also
have been q within a certain nearby spatiotemporal region as well. Similar
comments apply to the mark-transmission version of Salmon’s theory (see
Hitchcock 1995, sect. 4). These counterfactuals, however, assume that the
actual causal processes (or near counterparts of them) are present within
the hypothetical scenario described. We are simply unable to say, using
only the language of causal processes and interactions, that Jones would
not have become pregnant even if he had not taken the pills.
The problem of explanatory relevance is clearly one that Salmon took
to be of central importance. I have raised the question of whether Salmon’s
concepts of causal process and interaction can be put to use to shed light
on this problem. I am highly skeptical, but my goal in this essay is not
really to argue that it cannot be done. For example, Phil Dowe, in chapter
7 of his Physical Causation (2000; see also his 2004 in this volume), offers
a proposal that that may bear on this issue, and I have taken no pains
to refute that particular proposal here. My goal, rather, is to illustrate a
certain type of question that has received very little attention in the vast
literature inspired by Salmon’s work: just what sorts of philosophical
problems can be successfully addressed, once one has taken Salmon’s
conceptual apparatus on board? The most fitting philosophical tribute to
Salmon’s memory is to make genuine progress on those issues that he
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cared about. With respect to causal processes and interactions, the way
forward will not involve attempts to dot the i’s and cross the t’s in the
definitions of these concepts. Rather, we need to show how these concepts
can be made to do real philosophical work.
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